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Caballes, Place, and Economic
Rin-tin-tincentives
THE EFFECT OF CANINE SNIFF JURISPRUDENCE
ON THE DEMAND FOR AND DEVELOPMENT OF
SEARCH TECHNOLOGY
I.

INTRODUCTION

The “legal fiction” 1 of the canine sniff test’s infallibility
jeopardizes the development and application of surveillance
technologies that will allow law enforcement officers to better
provide for public safety without running afoul of the Fourth
Amendment’s proscription of unreasonable searches and
seizures. 2 In an era characterized by a continuing war on
narcotics trafficking and overshadowed by a continuing fear of
domestic terrorist attack, the importance of balancing privacy
interests against realistic assessments of the intrusiveness of
surveillance technologies is readily apparent.
Law
enforcement initiatives designed to curb the narcotics trade
and reduce the risk of terrorist incidents have made the drug

1

Illinois v. Caballes, 534 U.S. 405, 411 (2005) (Souter, J., dissenting).
To date, only one commentator has noted that legal rules providing
stringent protection for privacy rights create a corresponding demand on the part of
law enforcement officers for technologies that identify only the presence or absence of
illegal activity. Lee C. Milstein, Fortress of Solitude or Lair of Malevolence? Rethinking
the Desirability of Bright-Line Protection of the Home, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1789, 1816
(2003). While Milstein does not specifically address the effect that applying Fourth
Amendment scrutiny to canine sniffs will visit on law-enforcement demand, another
commentator has observed that “law enforcement agencies have too much invested in
their dog-training programs to placidly accept” court rulings subjecting canine sniffs to
Fourth Amendment scrutiny. Max A. Hansen, United States v. Solis: Have the
Government’s Supersniffers Come Down with a Case of Constitutional Nasal
Congestion?, 13 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 410, 411 (1976). Hansen’s claim provides strong
support for the inference that the laxity with which federal courts approached the
canine sniff prior to and after the Supreme Court’s ruling in Caballes provided strong
incentives for law enforcement agencies to invest in canine sniff programs. Scholarship
in the realms of economics and political science further supports this inference, noting
that “a strong Fourth Amendment and strict police accountability are jointly sufficient
for ongoing progress in search technology.” Hugo M. Mialon & Sue H. Mialon, The
Economics of the Fourth Amendment: Crime, Search, and Anti-Utopia, ECONPAPERS,
Sept. 2004, available at http://econpapers.repec.org/paper/emowp2003/0411.htm.
2
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and bomb-sniffing dog a regular feature of American life. 3
Such canines appear in our schools, at our major
transportation hubs, at our major landmarks, and at our
border patrol checkpoints. 4 Following the Supreme Court’s
ruling in Illinois v. Caballes, 5 which unequivocally insulated
the canine sniff test from Fourth Amendment scrutiny, there is
a strong likelihood that the police dog will become an even
more pervasive investigative device. 6 By authorizing police
officers to use the canine as an unrestricted tool capable of
generating the probable cause necessary to conduct full-blown
searches of random objects and individuals, 7 the Court has
decreased the likelihood that law enforcement agencies will
demand the development of more accurate and less intrusive
technologies. 8
The canine sniff was the first of only two investigative
techniques that the Supreme Court recognized as revealing
only the presence or absence of illegal activity. 9 Insisting in
United States v. Place that it knew of “no other investigative
procedure that is so limited both in the manner in which the
information is obtained and in the content of the information
revealed by the procedure,” the Court classed the canine sniff
as sui generis and resolved, albeit in dictum, that canine sniffs
were not “searches” and were therefore not subject to Fourth
Amendment scrutiny. 10 A year later, the Court discovered
another investigative procedure that was similarly limited,
holding in United States v. Jacobsen 11 that “a chemical test that
merely discloses whether or not a particular substance is
cocaine does not compromise any legitimate interest in privacy”

3
See generally Tom O’Connell, Drug Sniffing Dogs Introduced into L.A.
Schools, http://www.november.org/razorwire/rzold/09/0909.html (last visited Oct. 4,
2006); Brian Handwerk, “Detector Dogs” Sniff Out Smugglers for U.S. Customs,
NATIONAL GEOGRAPHIC NEWS, July 12, 2002, http://news.nationalgeographic.com/news/
2002/07/0712_020712_drugdogs.html; Marsha Walton, Bomb-Sniffing Dogs Head to
Airports, CNN SCI-TECH, Jan. 18, 2002, http://cnnstudentnews.cnn.com/2002/TECH/
science/01/18/rec.bomb.sniffing.dogs.02/.
4
See supra note 3.
5
Caballes, 543 U.S. at 409.
6
See id. at 410 (Souter, J., dissenting).
7
See id. at 417.
8
See infra note 30 and accompanying text for authority illustrating that
police alter their search and seizure behavior (including investigatory techniques) in
response to judicial decrees.
9
United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 707 (1983).
10
Id.
11
466 U.S. 109 (1984).
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and is therefore not a search within the meaning of the Fourth
Amendment. 12
The Court reconsidered the Fourth Amendment
implications of the canine sniff test in Illinois v. Caballes, 13
where it decided that a defendant’s right against unreasonable
searches and seizures had not been violated as a result of a
canine sniff test conducted during a traffic stop for speeding. 14
The Caballes Court reiterated the Place Court’s observation
that a canine sniff reveals only the presence or absence of
contraband and emphasized that investigative techniques
bearing this characteristic do not constitute “searches” under
the Fourth Amendment. 15 In a strong dissent, Justice Souter
noted that the court’s holding was based on the untenable
premise that canines do not err. 16 After offering considerable
empirical support for the proposition that drug sniffing canines
are in fact fallible, Justice Souter observed that the risk of false
positives justified treating the canine sniff as “the search that
it amounts to in practice.” 17 Because canines alert falsely,
Justice Souter reasoned, they run the risk of revealing more
than the mere presence or absence of illegal activity. 18 As
Justice Souter observed:
An affirmative reaction . . . does not identify a substance the police
already legitimately possess, but informs the police instead merely of
a reasonable chance of finding contraband they have yet to put their
hands on. The police will then open the container and discover
whatever lies within, be it marijuana or the owner’s private
papers. 19

Justice Souter’s dissent thus recognized, in substance,
that because false canine alerts present the risk of unjustified
governmental intrusions into the citizenry’s “persons, houses,
papers, and effects,” 20 they run the risk of compromising
legitimate interests protected by the Fourth Amendment. 21
Justice Souter therefore observed that, rather than giving law

12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21

Id. at 123.
543 U.S. 405, 407 (2005).
Id. at 408.
Id. at 409.
Id. at 410 (Souter, J., dissenting).
Id. at 414.
Id. at 410-13.
Caballes, 543 U.S. at 416.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
Caballes, 543 U.S. at 415-17 (Souter, J., dissenting).
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enforcement agencies license to utilize the canine sniff
indiscriminately, the Court should have required the search to
be justified by at least a minimal level of reasonable
suspicion. 22
Building upon Justice Souter’s implication that the risk
of false positives justifies treating the canine sniff and the
police conduct ensuing from it as a single investigatory process
constituting a search, this Note will explore the merits and
market implications of requiring heightened levels of suspicion
for the use of canines as an investigatory tool. By challenging
the Supreme Court’s rulings in United States v. Place, Illinois
v. Caballes, and Kyllo v. United States, 23 this Note will argue
that a jurisprudence recognizing the fallibility of the canine
sniff and requiring a heightened showing of suspicion on the
part of law enforcement officers will secure privacy interests
while incentivizing the development of surveillance
technologies that do not intrude upon legitimate privacy
interests. Part II of this Note will offer essential background
information and analysis concerning the economic and social
incentives that the Court’s Fourth Amendment jurisprudence
creates for law enforcement agencies. Part III will examine
and critique the development and current state of the law
pertaining to canine sniffs in an effort to illustrate that 1)
evidence coinciding with and post-dating Place indicates that
canine sniffs are not infallible; 2) canine sniffs are therefore
legible as the first step in a broader process enabling police
officers to inspect personal property that implicates legitimate
privacy interests; and 3) the use of drug sniffing canines as an
investigatory tool should therefore require, at a bare minimum,
reasonable articulable suspicion on the part of law enforcement
officers. Part IV will explore the implications of requiring law
enforcement officers to have reasonable articulable suspicion
prior to the application of a canine sniff test and suggest that 1)
the requirement of a showing of reasonable articulable
suspicion is too subjective to provide sufficient protection for
privacy interests; 2) a reasonable articulable suspicion
standard will incentivize overreaching by street level law
enforcement officers; and 3) the requirement of such a showing
will therefore encourage the perpetuation of status quo
investigatory techniques. Part V will argue that a requirement
22
23

Id. at 417.
533 U.S. 27, 40 (2001).
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of probable cause prior to the application of a canine sniff will
best protect privacy and public safety interests by illustrating
that 1) a probable cause regime places the greatest possible
burden upon law enforcement agencies when they rely on the
drug sniffing canine as an investigatory tool; 2) the rigors of
complying with probable cause’s burdensome guidelines will
render status quo investigatory techniques unattractive to law
enforcement officers; and 3) a requirement of probable cause
will therefore incentivize the development and application of
less invasive investigative techniques.
II.

OVERVIEW OF INCENTIVES FOR LAW ENFORCEMENT
AGENCIES CREATED BY THE FOURTH AMENDMENT’S
EXCLUSIONARY RULE

The Fourth Amendment provides that “[t]he right of the
people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not
be violated.” 24 Over the course of its Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence, the Supreme Court has sought to strike a
balance between the individual right to privacy and the public
interest in enabling law enforcement officials to investigate
crimes, make arrests, and obtain convictions. 25 The desire to
balance these interests has led to the adoption of an
evidentiary rule of exclusion (the “exclusionary rule”), which
provides that all evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth
Amendment will be inadmissible in a court of law. 26 The Court
has traditionally recognized that the exclusionary rule serves
to “compel respect for the [Fourth Amendment] in the only
effectively available way—by removing the incentive to
disregard it.” 27 As interpreted by the Courts of the United
States, the Fourth Amendment is designed to create a
structure of legal incentives to protect individuals against
unwarranted police intrusion. 28 It follows intuitively that this
24

U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
See Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630, 635 (1886) (noting that the
Fourth Amendment addresses “all invasions on the part of the government and its
employ[ee]s of the sanctity of a man’s home and the privacies of life” and that
Constitutional protections of privacy against government intrusion “should be liberally
construed,” because “[i]t is the duty of courts to be watchful for the constitutional rights
of the citizen, and against any stealthy encroachments thereon”).
26
The exclusionary rule was adopted at the federal level and made applicable
to the states in Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1966).
27
Id. at 656 (quoting Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 247 (1960)).
28
See id.; Kaufman v. United States, 394 U.S. 217, 229 (1969).
25
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incentive structure affects law enforcement agencies’ market
demand for technologies 29 —such as thermal imaging devices, xray scanners, stationary radar detectors, and drug sniffing
canines—that enhance police officers’ abilities to detect
unlawful activity, make arrests, or issue citations. 30
Faced with the possibility that such technologies may
enable police officers to invade the “privacies of life” 31 that have
traditionally been subject to the strong protection provided by
the Fourth Amendment’s exclusionary rule, courts examining
the Fourth Amendment implications of such technologies have
embarked upon two related inquiries.
Courts seek to
determine, first, whether the use of an investigatory technology
implicates the Fourth Amendment at all. 32 In the course of this
inquiry, courts will examine the privacy interests that the use
of a particular technology may compromise. 33 In the event that
29
This Note will use the term “technology” in its broad, etymological sense to
mean “the practical application of knowledge especially in a particular area,” “a
capability given by the practical application of knowledge,” or “a manner of
accomplishing a task especially using technical processes, methods, or knowledge.”
Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary, http://www.m-w.com/dictionary/technology (last
visited Oct. 4, 2006). While popular usage of the term “technology” might be limited to
inanimate objects possessing circuitry, this Note will consider thermal imaging devices,
x-ray scanners, stationary radar detectors, and drug sniffing canines under the rubric
of “technology” as defined above. The Supreme Court lent legal credence to this view of
“technology” when it recognized in United States v. Jacobsen that precedents it forged
with respect to canine sniffs were applicable in cases involving other investigative
techniques and technologies that revealed nothing other than the presence or absence
of illegal activity. United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 123-24 (1984). Moreover,
numerous scholars have observed the similarities between drug sniffing canines and
other forms of sense-enhancing technology, and have persuasively argued that legal
precedents created in the context of canine sniffs have implications for cases pertaining
to other search technologies. See, e.g., Leading Cases, Fourth Amendment—Canine
Sniff, 119 HARV. L. REV. 179, 184 (2005); David A. Harris, Superman’s X-Ray Vision
and the Fourth Amendment: The New Gun Detection Technology, 69 TEMP. L. REV. 1,
29-32 (1996).
30
Empirical studies of the effect of the exclusionary rule on the conduct of
police officers and the procedures of law enforcement agencies further reinforces this
proposition. See, Bradley C. Canon, Is the Exclusionary Rule Failing Health? Some
New Data and a Plea Against a Precipitous Conclusion, 62 KY. L.J. 681, 710 (1974)
(noting that immediately following the Court’s recognition of the exclusionary rule in
Mapp, police officers began to seek judicial search warrants more frequently than they
had prior to Mapp). Canon’s statistical analysis suggests that police behavior in the
context of search and seizure is responsive in the long term to judicial decrees
heightening law enforcement agencies’ burden to demonstrate compliance with the
Fourth Amendment. Id. See also Myron W. Orfield Jr., Note, The Exclusionary Rule
and Deterrence: An Empirical Study of Chicago Narcotics Officers, 54 U. CHI. L. REV.
1016, 1017 (1987) (noting that “[o]n an institutional level, the [exclusionary rule] has
changed police, prosecutorial, and judicial procedures”).
31
Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630 (1886).
32
Horton v. Goose Creek Indep. Sch. Dist., 690 F.2d 470, 476 (5th Cir. 1982).
33
Id.

2006]

ECONOMIC RIN-TIN-TINCENTIVES

285

the use of an investigative technology has the propensity to
compromise legitimate privacy interests, courts will hold that
use of the technology constitutes a “search” and that the
Fourth Amendment therefore applies. 34 Upon reaching this
threshold conclusion, courts will then seek to determine the
circumstances under which the Fourth Amendment will permit
the use of an investigatory technique that compromises
legitimate interests in privacy. 35 These determinations, in
turn, affect the extent to which law enforcement agencies will
demand search technologies. 36 If a court should conclude that
the use of a particular investigative technology constitutes a
“search” for Fourth Amendment purposes, police will be less
likely to invest in it, either out of fear that its use will give rise
to the application of the exclusionary rule or out of certainty
that using the technology in a manner compliant with the
Fourth Amendment would be cost-prohibitive. 37 If, on the other
hand, a court rules that the use of a particular investigative
technology does not constitute a search for Fourth Amendment
purposes, police will be more likely to invest in it because it can
be applied without fear that courts will suppress the evidence
that it uncovers on Fourth Amendment grounds. 38
A.

Incentives for Law Enforcement Agencies Under a NonSearch Regime

It is settled law that “the Fourth Amendment protects
people, not places,” 39 and that searches and seizures are to be
struck down as contrary to the provisions of the Fourth
34
See id. (noting that “[t]he decision to characterize an action as a search is
in essence a conclusion about whether the Fourth Amendment applies at all”).
35
See United States v. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102, 106 (1965).
36
See Canon, supra note 30, at 710 (noting that Supreme Court rulings are
effective in altering police behavior, including search and seizure conduct). See also
William J. Stuntz, The Distribution of Fourth Amendment Privacy, 67 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 1265, 1267 (noting that “[w]hen the Fourth Amendment limits the use of a police
tactic like house searches, it does two things: it raises the cost of using that tactic, and
it lowers the relative cost of using other tactics that might be substitutes”).
37
See Canon, supra note 30, at 710 (noting that immediately following the
Court’s recognition of the exclusionary rule in Mapp, police officers began to seek
judicial search warrants more frequently than they had prior to Mapp). Canon’s
statistical analysis suggests that police behavior in the context of search and seizure is
responsive in the long term to judicial decrees heightening law enforcement agencies’
burden to demonstrate compliance with the Fourth Amendment. Id. See also Orfield,
supra note 30, at 1017 (noting that “[o]n an institutional level, the [exclusionary rule]
has changed police, prosecutorial, and judicial procedures”).
38
See Stuntz, supra note 36.
39
Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967).
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Amendment whenever they unreasonably intrude upon an
individual’s reasonable “expectation[s] of privacy.” 40 Building
on the rule initially articulated in Katz v. United States, 41 the
Supreme Court resolved in United States v. Jacobsen 42 that
individuals can have no reasonable expectations of privacy
pertaining to contraband or illegal activity. 43 The Jacobsen
court concluded that no invasion of privacy had taken place
when federal agents conducted a chemical field test to
determine whether a white, powdery substance seeping from a
damaged air-freight parcel was in fact cocaine. 44 As the court
observed:
A chemical test that merely discloses whether or not a particular
substance is cocaine does not compromise any legitimate interest in
privacy. This conclusion is not dependent on the result of any
particular test. It is probably safe to assume that virtually all of the
tests conducted under circumstances comparable to those disclosed
by this record would result in a positive finding; in such cases, no
legitimate interest has been compromised. But even if the results
are negative—merely disclosing that the substance is something
other than cocaine—such a result reveals nothing of special interest.
Congress has decided—and there is no question about its power to do
so—to treat the interest in “privately” possessing cocaine as
illegitimate; thus governmental conduct that can reveal whether a
substance is cocaine, and no other arguably “private” fact,
compromises no legitimate privacy interest. 45

Relying on the observation that the chemical field test at issue
revealed only the presence or absence of criminal activity, the
Jacobsen court drew a comparison between the chemical field
test and the canine sniff test—an investigative technique that
it had classed as sui generis in United States v. Place. 46 The
Place court concluded that the canine sniff was in a class unto
itself because it revealed nothing more than the presence or
absence of illegal activity and therefore ensured that the
“owner of the property is not subjected to the embarrassment
and inconvenience entailed in less discriminate and more
intrusive investigative methods.” 47 Because the Court did not
view the canine sniff as compromising any legitimate interest
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47

Id. at 361.
Katz, 389 U.S. 347.
United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109 (1984).
Id. at 123.
Id. at 125.
Id. at 123.
462 U.S. 696, 707 (1983).
Id.
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in privacy, it concluded that canine sniffs were not searches
within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. 48
The Court’s ruling in Jacobsen went a step further and
lent credence to the view that any investigative technique
revealing only the presence or absence of illegal activity would
not give rise to Fourth Amendment scrutiny. 49 Because such
techniques do not constitute “searches” within the meaning of
the Fourth Amendment, they do not give rise to Fourth
Amendment inquiries pertaining to reasonableness or probable
Because courts have held that investigative
cause. 50
techniques such as canine sniffs and chemical field tests do not
implicate
Fourth
Amendment
concerns,
numerous
commentators have noted that courts treat them as “nonsearches.” 51 As the Fifth Circuit aptly put it, “the decision to
characterize an action as a search is in essence a conclusion
about whether the fourth amendment applies at all.” 52 As
such, courts have traditionally dispensed with reasonableness
and probable cause inquiries in cases involving so-called
“binary searches”—that is, investigative techniques revealing
only the presence or absence of illegal activity. 53
Binary search technologies are therefore attractive
investments to law enforcement agencies. A number of studies
have shown that the Court’s Fourth Amendment rulings—in
48

Id.
Jacobsen, 466 U.S. at 124.
50
See also Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 407 (2005) (canine sniff
revealing only presence or absence of narcotics did not give rise to Fourth Amendment
inquiry); City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 40 (2000) (vehicle checkpoints
with narcotics-detection dogs did not require reasonable suspicion or probable cause
because they revealed only the presence or absence of contraband); Place, 462 U.S. at
707 (canine sniff held sui generis because it was deemed “less intrusive” than other
investigative techniques and revealed only the presence or absence of illegal activity).
51
See Jeffrey A. Bekiares, Case Comment: Constitutional Law: Ratifying
Suspicionless Canine Sniffs: Dog Days on the Highways, 57 FLA. L. REV. 963, 971
(2005); Theresa A. O’Loughlin, Note: Guerrillas in the Midst: The Dangers of
Unchecked Police Powers Through the Use of Law Enforcement Checkpoints, 6 SUFFOLK
J. TRIAL & APP. ADV. 59, 76 (2001).
52
Horton v. Goose Creek Indep. Sch. Dist., 690 F.2d 470, 476 (5th Cir. 1982).
53
See supra note 50. The phrase “binary search” provides a useful shorthand
for “investigative techniques revealing merely the presence or absence of illegal
activity.” The phrase is scholarly in origin, and appears to have been coined by Ric
Simmons in From Katz to Kyllo: A Blueprint for Adapting the Fourth Amendment to
Twenty-First Century Technologies, 53 HASTINGS L.J. 1303, 1306 (2002). At the time of
Simmons’ writing, the Supreme Court had decided only two “binary search” cases:
Place, 462 U.S. 696 (involving canine sniff tests) and Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109 (involving
chemical field tests purported to reveal only the presence or absence of narcotics). The
Court’s binary search jurisprudence has since been supplemented by Caballes and,
arguably, Kyllo.
49
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particular, the advent of the exclusionary rule in Mapp—cause
law enforcement institutions and individual police officers to
alter their search and seizure behavior. 54 Moreover, scholars
have noted that the exclusionary rule encourages law
enforcement agencies that fear the deterrent remedies of
suppression and dismissal to “find a legal way to
obtain . . . evidence” rather than “waste their time in activities
made unproductive by the exclusionary rule.” 55 As such, binary
search technologies present police agencies with compelling
alternatives to more intrusive technologies. Furthermore,
because binary search technologies do not require law
enforcement institutions to incur the social, institutional, and
economic costs associated with proving that an investigatory
activity was supported by probable cause or reasonable
articulable suspicion, law enforcement agencies are likely to
maximize their use of investigative techniques that do not give
rise to Fourth Amendment scrutiny. 56 As one commentator has
noted, court-imposed search and seizure obligations operate as
a kind of “tax” on law enforcement agencies’ search and seizure
behavior. 57 Because the rigors of complying with the Fourth
Amendment impose considerable institutional costs on police, it
follows that they will seek to minimize this “tax” burden by
using investigatory techniques that do not trigger Fourth
Amendment scrutiny. 58
B.

Incentives for Law Enforcement Agencies Under
Reasonable Articulable Suspicion and Probable Cause
Regimes
1. Reasonable Articulable Suspicion

A court will “tax” investigative techniques by applying
Fourth Amendment scrutiny when those techniques risk
allowing police officers to detect more than the mere presence

54

See supra note 37.
Daniel J. Meltzer, Deterring Constitutional Violations by Law Enforcement
Officials, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 247 n.98 (1988).
56
See Stuntz, supra note 36 (noting that “[w]hen the Fourth Amendment
limits the use of a police tactic like house searches, it does two things: it raises the cost
of using that tactic, and it lowers the relative cost of using other tactics that might be
substitutes”).
57
Id. at 1275.
58
Id. (noting that “here as elsewhere, if you tax a given kind of behavior, you
will probably see less of it”).
55
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or absence of illegal activity. 59
When applying Fourth
Amendment scrutiny, courts will determine whether a search
was supported by one of two possible investigatory
prerequisites: reasonable articulable suspicion or probable
cause. 60 The Fourth Amendment requires, at a minimum, that
officers be able to justify a search or seizure by pointing to
specific articulable facts that generated suspicion. 61 This
investigatory prerequisite, which courts refer to as either
“reasonable suspicion” or “reasonable articulable suspicion,”
has been held to require police officers to show something more
than an arbitrary justification for a search or seizure, but
something less than full-blown probable cause. 62 Because the
quantum of evidence required under a reasonable articulable
suspicion regime is considerably less 63 than that required by
probable cause, courts usually apply the reasonable suspicion
standard where searches involve only minimal intrusions that
are limited in scope to the situation that gave rise to the search
in the first place. 64 Because the nature of the intrusion is
minimal in such cases, the “tax” that law enforcement agencies
incur in the course of justifying the intrusion is likewise
minimal, requiring only that police officers form impressions on
the basis of articulable facts and be able to recount and justify
those impressions in a court of law. 65
59
See Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 40 (2001) (subjecting technologies
revealing intimate details to a requirement of probable cause).
60
See generally United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1 (1989).
61
See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21 (1968) (holding that a limited search in
the context of a traffic stop may be justified when a “police officer [is] able to point to
specific and articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences from those
facts, reasonably warrant that intrusion”). To date, only the Ninth Circuit has held
that the application of a sense-enhancing technology requires reasonable articulable
suspicion, holding in United States v. Beale, 731 F.2d 590 (9th Cir. 1983), that canine
sniffs required “some articulable reason” as a prerequisite to their use. This holding
was later overruled by an en banc rehearing. See United States v. Beale, 736 F.2d
1289 (9th Cir. 1984) (en banc). In all other cases involving sense enhancing
technologies, courts have either ruled that the technologies at issue were of a binary
character, and therefore not subject to Fourth Amendment scrutiny or that such
technologies were intrusive, and therefore required probable cause. See supra notes
50, 59 and accompanying text.
62
See Sokolow, 490 U.S. at 7 (noting that the standard required for
validating searches under a reasonable articulable suspicion regime is “obviously less
demanding than that [required] for probable cause”).
63
Id.
64
See Terry, 392 U.S. at 21.
65
See Erica Flores, Case Comment, “People, Not Places”: The Fiction of
Consent, the Force of the Public Interest, and the Fallacy of Objectivity in Police
Encounters with Passengers During Traffic Stops, 7 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1071, 1091
(2006) (noting that the reasonable articulable suspicion standard is flawed because of
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The Supreme Court first articulated the contours of the
reasonable suspicion standard in Terry v. Ohio. 66 In Terry, a
police officer stopped and frisked three individuals who he
suspected were planning a robbery. 67 The officer witnessed two
of the individuals pacing back and forth between a street
corner and a store window. 68 The third individual approached
them and, after conferring with them briefly, left the scene. 69
After this occurred, the two individuals lingered for a while
before walking off in the same direction as the third man. 70
The officer followed the two individuals who had lingered on
the street corner and approached them when they caught up to
Fearing that at least one of the
the third individual. 71
individuals was armed, the officer frisked all three of them and
recovered firearms from two of the individuals. 72 The officer
admitted that he had no prior information regarding the three
individuals and that his suspicion that they were “casing a job,
a stick up” proceeded solely from what he had observed. 73 The
officer justified the frisks on the ground that he feared for his
own safety. 74 After refusing to suppress the weapons on Fourth
Amendment grounds, the trial court convicted the two
individuals from whom the officer recovered firearms on
charges of carrying concealed weapons. 75
Throughout all stages of Terry’s procedural history,
courts conceded that the searches were not supported by
probable cause, but nevertheless affirmed the trial court’s
refusal to suppress the weapons that the officer recovered from
the suspects. 76 Hearing the case after grant of certiorari, the
Supreme Court held that even where a search is not supported
by probable cause, it may nevertheless be reasonable when a
police officer’s action is “justified at its inception” and is
“reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which

“the judiciary’s almost unwavering deference to police determinations of whether it has
been satisfied”).
66
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
67
Id. at 6-7.
68
Id. at 6.
69
Id.
70
Id.
71
Id. at 6-7.
72
Terry, 392 U.S. at 6.
73
Id. at 6-7.
74
Id. at 30.
75
Id. at 7-8.
76
Id. at 8.
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justified the interference in the first place.” 77 The Court
observed that the officer’s actions were justified at their
inception because he had witnessed the defendants “go through
a series of acts, each of them perhaps innocent in itself, but
which taken together warranted further investigation.” 78
Moreover, the Court noted that the search was reasonably
related in scope to the circumstances that gave rise to the
intrusion because the officer’s fear that the individuals were
contemplating a daytime robbery lent reasonable support to his
However, the Court
suspicion that they were armed. 79
emphasized that the reasonableness of the search turned
rather significantly on the manner in which it was conducted. 80
Because the officer only patted down the surface of the
suspects’ clothing and did not intrude further until he felt the
guns underneath the surface, the Court held that the search
was “limited” and that it therefore complied with the Fourth
Amendment even in the absence of full-blown probable cause. 81
The Terry Court thus announced that a search may be
constitutionally permissible even in the absence of probable
cause in cases where an officer can point to specific articulable
facts to justify the intrusion and tailors the intrusion to both
the scope of those facts and the inferences that he draws from
them. 82 To the extent that this reasonable articulable suspicion
standard may be said to “tax” law enforcement agencies by
imposing Fourth Amendment obligations, it appears to impose
only a minimal burden. Because the impressions that a single
police officer forms over a brief period of time are sufficient to
generate reasonable articulable suspicion, law enforcement
agencies are not required to conduct the lengthy investigative
processes necessary to justify searches under a probable cause
regime. 83 Moreover, because courts rely on the interpretations
of individual police officers in the course of determining
whether a limited search was supported by reasonable
articulable suspicion, the sole institutional obligation that a
77

Id. at 20.
Terry, 392 U.S. at 22.
79
Id. at 28.
80
Id.
81
Id. at 28-30.
82
Id. at 20-21.
83
See United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7 (1985) (noting that the proof
required to justify a search under a reasonable articulable suspicion regime is
“considerably less” than that required under a preponderance of the evidence
standard).
78
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reasonable suspicion regime imposes upon law enforcement
agencies is the duty of individual officers to testify as to
specific, articulable facts that warranted the intrusion. 84
Finally, as explained at greater length below, courts typically
defer to such testimony, which means that evidence is rarely
suppressed in situations where a “limited” search requires only
As such, while the
reasonable articulable suspicion. 85
institutional costs imposed by a reasonable articulable
suspicion regime appear to be minimally higher than those
associated with investigative techniques to which the Fourth
Amendment does not apply, they are nevertheless far lower
than the institutional costs associated with a requirement of
probable cause. It follows from these observations that an
investigative technology would remain at least somewhat
attractive to law enforcement agencies if a court was to rule
that its use constituted only a minimal intrusion that must be
supported by specific, articulable facts.
2. Probable Cause
Courts impose the maximum “tax” of probable cause in
situations where police officers seek to intrude more
significantly upon an individual’s private affairs. 86 The “tax”
imposed on law enforcement agencies and individual police
officers is greater in such instances, because probable cause
requires a quantum of evidence sufficient to merit the issuance
of a warrant. 87 While searches conducted under the auspices of
probable cause are generally supported by a judicial warrant,
even warrantless searches conducted in the field must be
supported by probable cause when they involve more than
“limited” intrusions into the public’s “person, houses, papers,

84

See Flores, supra note 65, at 1091 (noting that the reasonable articulable
suspicion standard is flawed because of “the judiciary’s almost unwavering deference to
police determinations of whether it has been satisfied”).
85
See id.
86
Both reasonable articulable suspicion and probable cause are determined
according to reasonableness under the totality of the circumstances. See Sokolow, 490
U.S. at 7-8. Nevertheless, the Supreme Court has endorsed the view that probable
cause requires considerably more proof of wrongdoing than reasonable articulable
suspicion. See id. at 7. As the Court held in Terry v. Ohio, reasonable suspicion may
justify a search pursuant to a lesser quantum of evidence than that required for
probable cause only when the nature of the intrusion is limited. 392 U.S. at 28-30. As
such, it follows that probable cause is required where the nature of the intrusion is
greater. See infra notes 98-103 and accompanying text.
87
See United States v. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102, 109 (1965).
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and effects.” 88 Indeed, fear of incurring the judicial penalties of
suppression or dismissal has led police officers to seek
warrants with greater frequency in the years following the
establishment of the exclusionary rule. 89 In cases where police
seek warrants, the cost of engaging in investigative activity
naturally increases due to the exigencies of gathering evidence,
presenting it to a magistrate, filing a sworn affidavit affirming
the existence of probable cause, and persuading the magistrate
that probable cause exists. 90
Even in cases where police conduct searches without
judicially granted warrants, a court will conduct a de novo
review of the facts to determine whether the quantum of
evidence available to the officer was sufficient to merit the
issuance of a warrant on the ground of probable cause. 91 In
order for suspicion to rise to a level sufficient to merit a judicial
warrant, a court must find that the information justifying the
warrant request is sufficiently trustworthy to be considered
and that the amount of evidence offered is sufficient to
constitute probable cause. 92 A court will require a greater
showing as to the “trustworthiness” of evidence under a
probable cause regime than it will under a reasonable
articulable suspicion regime, 93 and the quantum of evidence
that is required for a search to be supported by probable cause
is likewise much greater. 94 As such, a probable cause regime
“taxes” law enforcement agencies more than a reasonable
articulable suspicion regime, requiring them to produce a
quantum of evidence far exceeding the subjective impressions
required by reasonable suspicion. 95 Because producing such
88

U.S. Const. amend. IV.
See Orfield, supra note 30, at 1017-18.
90
See John E. Theuman, Annotation, Validity of, and Admissibility of
Evidence Discovered in, Search Authorized by Judge over Telephone, 38 A.L.R. 4th 1145
(2004) (outlining the standard procedure for the issuance of a warrant).
91
See Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 690 (1996) (holding that
appellate courts should conduct de novo review of warrantless searches to determine
whether probable cause actually existed).
92
See Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108, 112-14 (1964) (affirming that the
trustworthiness of information must be evaluated according to its basis and veracity),
overruled on other grounds by Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 (1983).
93
See Ornelas, 517 U.S. at 695 (treating probable cause and reasonable
suspicion as similarly fluid inquiries involving inquiry into the totality of the
circumstances).
94
See Sokolow, 490 U.S. at 7 (noting that the quantum of evidence required
under a reasonable articulable suspicion regime is less than that required by probable
cause).
95
Id.
89
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evidence imposes pervasive procedural and institutional costs
on law enforcement agencies, it follows that police officers are
least likely to prefer investigative techniques that require a
showing of probable cause to justify their use. 96
In cases involving investigatory technologies, courts are
particularly likely to require probable cause when law
enforcement agencies employ technologies not in public use. 97
In Kyllo v. United States, the Court considered the use of
thermal imaging devices to detect the growth of marijuana
inside homes. 98 The technology at issue in Kyllo enabled police
officers to determine whether the levels of heat emanating from
a home were consistent with the use of high intensity lamps
typically used in the process of indoor marijuana growth. 99 The
thermal imaging device used by the police officers converted
radiation into images on the basis of relative warmth,
producing only a “crude visual image” of infrared radiation
emanating from the home. 100 The Kyllo court held that the use
of the thermal imaging device was subject to Fourth
Amendment scrutiny because the device was not in public use
and enabled law enforcement officers to obtain “information
regarding the interior of the home” that could not otherwise
have been obtained without physical intrusion. 101 Although the
Court offered sparse justification for hinging the probable
cause requirement on whether or not a technology is in general
public use, the requirement is in all likelihood based on the
notion that an individual cannot have reasonable expectations
of privacy pertaining to activities that a member of the general
public could become privy to by use of widely available
technology. 102 As such, the Court ultimately concluded that the
use of thermal imaging devices to obtain information regarding
the interior of the home was presumptively unreasonable
96

See Stuntz, supra note 36, at 1284.
See Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 40 (2001). Read side by side with
the Court’s holdings in Caballes and Place, the Kyllo Court’s conclusion that the use of
search technologies not in general public use must be supported by probable cause begs
the obvious question of whether the drug sniffing canine may be deemed to be “in
general public use.” See id.
98
Id.
99
Id. at 29.
100
Id. at 30.
101
Id. at 34.
102
Id. (presumably referring to reasonable expectations of privacy when
justifying the “general public use” requirement by stating that the rule “assures
preservation of that degree of privacy against government that existed when the
Fourth Amendment was adopted”).
97
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unless conducted under the auspices of probable cause,
pursuant to a judicially granted warrant. 103
The Kyllo rule is likely to place a strong burden on law
enforcement agencies seeking to use surveillance technologies
that courts deem to compromise legitimate privacy interests.
Although the Kyllo decision turned rather significantly on the
fact that a new technology was used to glean information
regarding the home, dictum concerning the thermal imaging
device’s ability to reveal purely innocent behavior—such as the
time of day that the “lady of the house takes her daily sauna”—
at least suggests that the decision turned, in part, on the
ability of the emergent surveillance technology to disclose more
than the presence or absence of illegal activity. 104 When
analyzed in conjunction with the holdings of Place, Caballes,
and Jacobsen, this dictum lends credence to the view that
surveillance technologies will trigger at least a minimal level of
Fourth Amendment scrutiny whenever they reveal more than
the presence or absence of illegal activity. Although the Court
has yet to examine devices such as the thermal imager outside
the context of home surveillance, Kyllo’s observation that
thermal imaging devices reveal “intimate” details suggests that
such devices would implicate Fourth Amendment concerns
regardless of the context in which they are used. 105
Since the Court held that the application of technologies
not in general public use requires probable cause in the context
of home surveillance, it created a disincentive for law
enforcement agencies to invest in emerging search technologies
that might be used to scrutinize the home. 106 Since such
technologies, by virtue of the mere fact that they are “new,”
generally tend not to be in public use, it follows that the Kyllo
rule provides a strong incentive for law enforcement agencies
to maintain status quo investigatory techniques. As a result of
Kyllo, it appears likely that law enforcement agencies will
continue to invest in canine detection 107 and forgo investment

103

Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 40.
Id. at 38.
105
Id.
106
See Stuntz, supra note 36.
107
See Max A. Hansen, United States v. Solis: Have the Government’s
Supersniffers Come Down with a Case of Constitutional Nasal Congestion?, 13 SAN
DIEGO L. REV. 410, 411 (1976) (observing that “[l]aw enforcement agencies have too
much invested in their dog training programs to placidly accept” court rulings
subjecting canine sniffs to Fourth Amendment scrutiny).
104
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in emerging technologies regardless of whether
technologies are more accurate and less invasive. 108
III.

those

ANALYSIS AND CRITICISM OF CANINE SNIFFS UNDER THE
CURRENT NON-SEARCH REGIME

As noted above, investigative techniques that do not
interfere with an individual’s reasonable expectations of
privacy are considered “non-searches” for the purpose of Fourth
Amendment inquiry and do not require courts to apply either
reasonable suspicion or probable cause standards. 109 Because
so-called binary searches are thought to reveal only the
presence or absence of illegal activity, these investigative
techniques fall outside the scope of the Fourth Amendment. 110
Of the two investigative technologies that the Court has
exempted from Fourth Amendment scrutiny, the canine sniff
test was reconsidered most recently in Illinois v. Caballes. 111 In
Caballes, the Court reiterated its decades-old position that
canine sniff tests are not subject to the Fourth Amendment
because they are limited intrusions that reveal only the
presence or absence of contraband. 112 Caballes involved a drug
conviction resulting from a canine sniff conducted during a
routine traffic stop. 113 An Illinois state trooper stopped Roy I.
Caballes for speeding on the highway and radioed his police
dispatcher to report the stop. 114 Overhearing this transmission,
a second trooper drove to the location of the stop with a drugdetecting canine. 115 While the first trooper was writing out a
citation for Caballes’ speeding, the second trooper walked his
dog around the car. 116 The dog alerted to Caballes’ trunk, and a
subsequent search revealed marijuana. 117
In a brief opinion that insulated the canine sniff test
from Fourth Amendment scrutiny, the Caballes majority was
careful to cite United States v. Jacobsen, where the Court
observed that chemical field tests for the presence of narcotics
108
109
110
111
112
113
114
115
116
117

See supra note 36.
See supra note 53 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 49-53 and accompanying text.
543 U.S. 405 (2005).
Id. at 408.
Id. at 406.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 406.
Caballes, 543 U.S. at 408.
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were not searches because, like the canine sniff test, they
reveal only the presence or absence of illegal activity. 118 The
fact that the Supreme Court grouped the canine sniff and the
chemical field test together under the “binary search” rubric
illustrates not only the fictitious quality of the Court’s canine
sniff jurisprudence, but also the specious reasoning underlying
the formation of the category itself. 119 The reliability of the
chemical field test has been called into question. 120 Likewise,
federal case law and private research have shown that canine
sniffs are not as reliable as the Court would like to believe. 121
While the inherent unreliability of both investigative
procedures raises the specter of unwarranted intrusions upon
innocent individuals’ reasonable expectations of privacy, the
fact that chemical field tests are invariably performed upon
substances lawfully within police custody establishes that the
intrusion of the chemical field test does not rise to the same
level of invasiveness as the intrusion enabled by a false canine
alert. 122 Unlike the chemical field test, which is immune from
Fourth Amendment scrutiny when performed upon substances
lying in plain view, the canine sniff test is applied for the
Moreover,
purpose of locating concealed substances. 123
chemical field tests arguably do not involve the same level of
intrusion and intimidation that may arise in the context of a
canine-wielding police officer approaching an individual or that
individual’s property. 124
Despite the obvious disparities between canine sniffs
and chemical field tests, the Caballes Court nevertheless
observed that both investigative techniques are not searches
because they reveal only the presence or absence of
contraband. 125 In so holding, the Court at long last gave
precedential force to decades-old dictum from United States v.
Place, in which the Court observed that canine sniffs “[do] not
118

Id. at 408.
Id.; United States v. Jacobson, 466 U.S. 109, 124 (1984).
120
See Blanchard & Chin, Identifying the Enemy in the War on Drugs, 47 AM.
U. L. REV. 557, 583 n.160 (1998) (noting that “typically, field tests used by officers are
merely indicative and not conclusive of the presence of a narcotic substance”).
121
See Caballes, 543 U.S. at 412 (Souter, J., dissenting) (citing K. Garner et
al., Duty Cycle of the Detector Dog: A Baseline Study (Apr. 2001) (prepared under
Federal Aviation Administration grant by the Institute for Biological Detection
Systems of Auburn University)).
122
See id. at 415.
123
Id. at 416.
124
Id. at 417-25 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
125
Id. at 409-10.
119
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constitute [searches] within the meaning of the Fourth
Amendment” because the limited disclosures afforded by dog
sniffs “ensure[] that the owner of . . . property is not subjected
to the embarrassment and inconvenience entailed in less
discriminate and more intrusive investigative methods.” 126 The
Place Court offered no empirical justification for its dictum that
canine sniffs reveal only the presence or absence of contraband,
and the fact that the observation was inessential to the Court’s
holding is underscored by the Court’s failure to ask the parties
to brief the issue. 127 Nevertheless, the Caballes Court seized
upon the Place Court’s dictum in concluding that because
canine sniffs are not searches, they do not implicate the Fourth
Amendment and, therefore, do not require a showing of
probable cause or reasonable articulable suspicion prior to
their application. 128
The dubious validity of the Place Court’s dictum
notwithstanding, the Caballes Court used this analysis to
distinguish its ruling from Kyllo v. United States, 129 where a
divided Court held that the warrantless use of a thermal
imaging device to detect the growth of marijuana in a home
was impermissible under the Fourth Amendment because the
device was not in public use and had the potential to reveal
more information than the presence or absence of criminal
activity. 130 The Caballes Court’s insistence that a canine sniff
“only reveals the presence of contraband” and therefore
“compromises no legitimate privacy interest” is specious,
however, insofar as it fails to adequately address petitioner’s
argument that “error rates, particularly the existence of false
positives, call into question the premise that drug-detection
dogs alert only to contraband.” 131 Noting that “the record
contains no evidence or findings that support [petitioner’s]
argument,” the Court went on to suggest that since “an
erroneous alert, in and of itself, reveals . . . [no] legitimate
private information” it may be found “sufficiently reliable to
establish probable cause to conduct a full-blown search.” 132

126

462 U.S. 696, 707 (1983).
See H. Paul Honsinger, Katz and Dogs: Canine Sniff Inspections and the
Fourth Amendment, 44 LA. L. REV. 1093, 1100 (1984).
128
Place, 462 U.S. at 707.
129
533 U.S. 27 (2001).
130
Id. at 40.
131
Caballes, 543 U.S. at 405.
132
Id. at 409.
127
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In so holding, the Court failed to acknowledge the
reality, observed by Justice Souter in his dissent, that a “dog
who alerts hundreds of times will be wrong dozens of times.” 133
Justice Souter’s observation narrows the alleged gulf between
Kyllo and Caballes, suggesting that a canine sniff test may
amount, in some cases, to the functional equivalent of other
investigatory techniques that are subject to Fourth
Amendment scrutiny due to the fact that they disclose more
than the presence or absence of contraband. While it is true
that an erroneous canine sniff “in and of itself” 134 discloses no
concrete facts about the contents of the object or individual
being subjected to the investigation, such a procedure, when
combined with the ensuing police inspection that it authorizes,
carries with it the same potential for embarrassment and
invasion at stake in the case of a thermal imaging device. 135 In
fact, the possibility of false positives may implicate stronger
privacy interests than those compromised by a thermal
imaging device. 136 Whereas the thermal imaging device at
issue in Kyllo was capable only of exposing “a crude image” of
heat emanating from a home and did not enable police officers
to discern persons or objects inside the domicile, a false canine
alert enables a police officer to conduct a full-blown physical
search of the contents of a container. 137 As such, Justice Souter
was correct to observe that “it makes sense . . . to treat a sniff
as the search that it amounts to in practice, and to rely on the
body of our Fourth Amendment cases, including Kyllo, in
deciding whether such a search is reasonable.” 138
133

Id. at 412 (Souter, J., dissenting).
Id. at 409 (majority opinion).
135
Id. at 412 (Souter, J., dissenting).
136
This claim assumes that “intimate details” disclosed as the outcome of a
search carry with them stronger privacy interests than so-called “insignificant” details.
While the Kyllo decision hinged, in part, on the proposition that all details disclosed
during surveillance of the home are “intimate,” nothing in the Caballes decision
indicates that a dog sniff would be an impermissible search if performed outside the
door of a home or apartment. As such, it may be the case that the rulings of Kyllo and
Caballes are on a collision course with one another.
137
Caballes, 543 U.S. at 413 (Souter, J., dissenting).
138
Id. at 413. The failure to harmonize Kyllo is not the sole problem with the
Caballes Court’s reasoning. As Justice Ginsburg persuasively observed in her own
Caballes dissent, the canine sniff at issue was also contrary to the Court’s ruling in
Terry v. Ohio, where it held that the investigative techniques employed by police
officers must be “reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which justified the
interference in the first place.” See id. at 418 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (citing Terry v.
Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20 (1968)). While the Court’s failure to consider Terry may be
indicative of a broad desire to uphold canine sniffs in all circumstances, for the
purposes of this Note it is sufficient to observe that error rates provide sufficient
134
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The history of federal canine sniff jurisprudence is
replete with evidence of the method’s unreliability. 139 While
the lion’s share of cases casting doubt on the technique’s
infallibility predate the Supreme Court’s controlling rulings in
Place and Caballes, their unique facts nevertheless indicate
that dogs are far from one hundred percent accurate. In
United States v. Sullivan, 140 the Fourth Circuit concluded that
a canine sniff was not a search despite the fact that law
enforcement officers relied on less than a “full alert” to
generate the probable cause necessary to conduct a full-blown
search of the defendant’s luggage. 141 As the Court put it, the
dog did not “give signs of sensing drugs by pawing at the
luggage excitedly, but he did show an interest in one blue
bag.” 142 The Court’s anthropomorphic treatment of the canine
may strike some as humorous, but the very notion that a welltrained canine engaged in a police investigation can show less
than “full alert” also casts significant doubt on the binary
character of the sniff test. The facts in Sullivan illustrate that,
rather than alerting to the presence of contraband, canines
may also indicate the mere possibility of such a presence. 143
While it is true that the investigation in Sullivan resulted in a
seizure of narcotics, this seizure was the outcome of a less than
reliable application of the dog sniff technique. 144 Although the
Sullivan ruling predates Caballes, nothing in the controlling
case indicated that the course of action undertaken by police
officers in Sullivan ran afoul of the Fourth Amendment.
Because the Caballes majority failed to analyze the sniff test as
a single investigatory process comprised of the activities of a
canine and his police handlers, it provided no mechanism for
distinguishing between an alert and a mere indication of
interest. 145 In essence, the Caballes rule permits dogs to sniff
ground to hold that canine sniffs are searches under the rule articulated in Katz and
extended in Kyllo.
139
See generally Merrett v. Moore, 58 F.3d 1547 (11th Cir. 1995); United
States v. Sullivan, 625 F.2d 9 (4th Cir. 1980); Doe v. Renfrow, 475 F. Supp. 1012 (N.D.
Ind. 1979).
140
625 F.2d 9 (4th Cir. 1980).
141
Id. at 12-13.
142
Id. at 12 (emphasis added).
143
This possibility also arose in United States v. Guzman, 75 F.3d 1090, 109192 (6th Cir. 1996), where a handler also distinguished between a dog’s “interest” and
full alert.
144
See id. at 1096 (acknowledging prior to Caballes that a dog’s “interest” in a
bag alone would not constitute probable cause).
145
See Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 416 (2005) (Souter, J., dissenting).
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persons and objects indiscriminately 146 and allows law
enforcement officers to interpret a dog’s behavior in whatever
manner they wish. 147 This concern is all the more prevalent
insofar as the conclusiveness of canine sniffs is so often
predicated on the subjective impressions of dog handlers. 148 As
one commentator has noted, “[c]anines often have their own
particular pattern for communicating an alert. If a handler is
not aware of a dog’s particular behavior, she may mistake an
indication of narcotics for a reaction to food, another animal, or
other distraction.” 149
To the extent that Caballes can be read as authorizing
the investigative process at issue in Sullivan, it is clear that
current law permits a less than full canine alert to justify a
full-blown search, particularly when a canine’s “interest” is
accompanied by individualized suspicion. 150 This observation
once again suggests a closer parallel between canine sniffs and
the surveillance technology at issue in Kyllo than the Caballes
majority was willing to admit. As one commentator has noted,
a canine “interest” in an object or person may proceed from
nothing other than innocent factors such as the scent of food,
perfume, or another animal. 151 Similarly, in Kyllo, the thermal
imaging device at issue had the ability to detect heat
signatures that might have been owing to any number of
innocent factors. 152 As such, Sullivan’s fact pattern supports
the revision of the Caballes rule to reflect the fact that canines
may alert to the possibility rather than the certainty of the
presence of contraband.

146

See id. at 422-23 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
See Robert C. Bird, An Examination of the Training and Reliability of the
Narcotics Detecting Dog, 85 KY. L. J. 405, 424-35 (1997) (noting that false positives
typically result from subjective error on the part of canine handlers). The analysis
above presumes that misinterpretations may also be willful.
148
Id.
149
Id. at 423 (citation omitted).
150
See United States v. Guzman, 75 F.3d 1090, 1091-92 (6th Cir. 1996);
United States v. Jacobs, 986 F.2d 1231, 1235 (8th Cir. 1993). It is worth noting that
neither of these cases requires individualized suspicion as a precondition for the
application of a canine sniff. They merely note that a canine “interest” in a person or
receptacle is only sufficient to generate probable cause when accompanied by
independent observations tending to arouse articulable suspicion. Guzman, 75 F.3d at
1096; Jacobs, 986 F.2d at 1235.
151
Bird, supra note 147, at 423.
152
Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 38 (2001) (observing that heat
signatures might be generated by “the lady of the house tak[ing] her daily sauna and
bath”).
147
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Where Sullivan suggests that canine behavior may be
less than certain in a given investigatory situation, the
notorious case of Doe v. Renfrow 153 illustrates that canines are
downright incorrect in many cases. 154 In Doe, a dog alerted
when it sniffed a thirteen-year-old girl during the course of a
warrantless dragnet inspection at an Indiana junior high
school. 155 When a superficial search of the student’s person
failed to uncover contraband, she was subjected to an equally
fruitless strip search. 156 It was later discovered that the
student had been playing with her own dog, which was in heat,
on the morning of the search. 157 The false alerts at issue in Doe
were not limited to this one individual. Although police dogs
alerted to more than fifty students during the course of the
dragnet inspection, 158 contraband was recovered from only
seventeen students. 159 As such, Doe strongly subverts the
judicial myth that canine sniffs are one hundred percent
accurate and supports a more realistic classification of the
canine sniff as a search subject to Fourth Amendment scrutiny.
While it is perhaps the case that the mere application of canine
sniffs did not impinge upon the students’ reasonable
expectations of privacy, the Court did not hesitate to conclude
that the subsequent strip search prompted by a false alert
deprived the student of her Fourth Amendment rights. As the
above analysis has shown, there is no rational basis for
distinguishing between the sniff and the conduct of a police
officer, because handlers may erroneously interpret canine
behavior as an alert. 160 As such, it makes sense to treat the
canine sniff as the first step in an investigatory procedure
implicating the Fourth Amendment.
The Supreme Court’s broad ruling in Place that canine
sniffs reveal only the presence or absence of criminal activity
placed the Court’s canine sniff jurisprudence on a collision
course with the factual scenario that the Eleventh Circuit
considered in Merrett v. Moore. 161 In Merrett, the Eleventh
Circuit ruled on the constitutionality of a dragnet procedure in
153
154
155
156
157
158
159
160
161

475 F. Supp. 1012 (N.D. Ind. 1979).
Id. at 1017.
Id. at 1016-17, 1019.
Id. at 1017.
Id.
Id. at 1028.
Doe, 475 F. Supp. at 1017.
See supra notes 147-49 and accompanying text.
58 F.3d 1547, 1553 (11th Cir. 1995).
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which police officers conducted a series of canine sniff tests on
automobiles stopped at a highway roadblock. 162 Although the
procedure generated twenty-eight canine alerts, only one
person was arrested for possession of narcotics. 163 Despite
recounting evidence of false positives in its own recitation of
the facts, the Court nevertheless relied on Place in holding that
canine sniffs are not searches under the Fourth Amendment. 164
As if aware of the inherent inconsistency between the facts
before it and the Supreme Court’s classification of the canine
sniff as a binary search, the Court declined to quote the Place
rationale that canine sniffs disclose only the presence or
absence of illegal activity. 165 Considered in this light, Merrett
provides what is perhaps the best rationale for revising the
rule articulated in Caballes and Place. By forging a rule based
on the proposition that canines do not err, the Supreme Court
has doomed district and circuit courts considering cases
involving false positives to contradict themselves in the sheer
act of adhering to controlling authority. As such, the interest
of judicial consistency mandates that the rule be altered to
require either reasonable suspicion or probable cause.
The circuit courts’ rulings in each of the cases discussed
above are consistent with the rule articulated by the Supreme
Court in Caballes. Before Caballes, only a minority of circuit
courts were willing to subject canine sniffs to Fourth
Amendment scrutiny, and then only in special cases. 166 These
limitations on the canine sniff have been swept away in favor of
an authoritative ruling that enables law enforcement officers to
conduct canine sniffs at random without need for probable
In an era when law
cause or reasonable suspicion. 167
enforcement agencies increasingly seek to maximize the use of
surveillance technologies in the service of public safety, it is a
matter of common sense that legal rules insulating police
canine usage from Fourth Amendment scrutiny will incentivize
continued police reliance on the canine as an investigatory tool.
It follows from this observation that the use of canines will
increase, perhaps even to the point of constituting random,
162
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Id. at 1549.
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United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 707 (1983).
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See generally United States v. Beale, 674 F.2d 1327 (9th Cir. 1982); United
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dragnet-type searching. 168 Ironically, the incentive for police
officers to increase their usage of canine detection may
ultimately decrease the net effectiveness of canine sniffs due to
the fact that “dog sniffs are most effective when implemented
in tandem with law enforcement expertise and least effective
when conducting random searches.” 169
This final observation suggests that the incentives
created for law enforcement officers under a non-search regime
endanger not only individual rights to privacy, but also public
safety. Because canines err, a false alert may enable law
enforcement officers to intrude upon the “privacies of life” 170
that should be protected by the Fourth Amendment’s
exclusionary rule. 171 Moreover, the “legal fiction” that canine
sniffs are one hundred percent accurate authorizes police
officers to use canines indiscriminately and thereby reduces the
net effectiveness of the canine as an investigatory tool. 172
Finally, because the Court’s ruling in Kyllo would subject
possible alternatives to the canine sniff test to a higher Fourth
Amendment burden by requiring a showing of probable
cause, 173 it follows that law enforcement agencies have little
incentive to seek more accurate and less intrusive investigatory
technologies. The current non-search regime thus creates a
situation in which police officers would rather maintain the
status quo than embrace technologies that require showings of
reasonable suspicion or probable cause.
IV.

ANALYSIS AND CRITICISM OF CANINE SNIFFS UNDER A
REASONABLE ARTICULABLE SUSPICION REGIME

The insufficiencies of the Supreme Court’s empirical
assumptions highlighted in the above analysis of Caballes and
Place suggest that the canine sniff’s unreliability requires some
level of Fourth Amendment scrutiny. Numerous scholars have
suggested that the low-level intrusiveness of canine sniffs
merits the requirement of a level of suspicion rising above
arbitrariness but falling short of full-blown probable cause. 174
168
169
170
171
172
173
174

Id.
Bird, supra note 147, at 426-27.
Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630 (1886).
Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1966).
Bird, supra note 147.
Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 40 (2001).
See, e.g., Honsinger, supra note 127, at 1106-07.
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While the assumption that canine sniffs are relatively
unintrusive when compared with other investigative
techniques will be subject to interrogation in the portion of this
Note dealing with the implications of a probable cause regime,
the analysis that follows will examine the policy implications of
requiring only a showing of reasonable articulable suspicion
rather than the full-blown probable cause required by more
intrusive investigative methods.
Viewing reasonable
articulable suspicion from the standpoint of economic incentive,
this analysis will show not only that the deference with which
courts have treated the reasonable articulable suspicion test is
likely to result in the perpetuation of status quo investigatory
techniques, but also that deference to the judgment of police
officers under a reasonable suspicion regime will result in a
standard that differs from arbitrariness in name alone.
The Supreme Court has held that reasonable articulable
suspicion “is a less demanding standard than probable cause
not only in the sense that reasonable suspicion can be
established with information that is different in quantity or
content than that required to establish probable cause, but also
in the sense that reasonable suspicion can arise from
information that is less reliable than that required to show
probable cause.” 175 In Terry v. Ohio, the Supreme Court held
that a “limited” search can be justified on the basis of
reasonable suspicion when a “police officer [is] able to point to
specific and articulable facts which, taken together with
rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant that
intrusion.” 176 In order to determine whether a search is
reasonable, courts should balance the “nature and extent of the
governmental interests involved” against the searched
individual’s expectations of freedom from interference by law
enforcement officers. 177 When considering the quantum of
evidence necessary to generate reasonable suspicion, the
Supreme Court has never provided a hard and fast rule,
holding instead that the standard is “obviously less demanding
than that required for probable cause” 178 and requires
“considerably less” 179 proof of wrongdoing than a preponderance
of the evidence standard would necessitate. The nebulosity of
175
176
177
178
179

Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 330 (1990).
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21, 30-31 (1968).
Id. at 22.
United Sates v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7 (1989).
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these principles has resulted in a standard that is so
deferential to the judgment of police officers that practically
any articulated justification is sufficient to withstand Fourth
Amendment scrutiny. 180
To determine whether a search or seizure is supported
by “reasonable suspicion,” a court will evaluate the totality of
the circumstances of each case to ascertain whether a law
enforcement officer had a “particularized and objective basis”
While
for suspecting that criminal activity was afoot. 181
nominally “objective,” the reasonable suspicion test
nevertheless permits police officers to rely on “their own
experience and specialized training to make inferences from
and deductions about the cumulative information available to
them that ‘might well elude an untrained person.’” 182 The
standard for evaluating the propriety of investigatory conduct
supported by reasonable suspicion is therefore not that of a
reasonable individual, but rather an individual “versed in the
field of law enforcement.” 183 While the Supreme Court has gone
to great lengths to characterize the reasonable articulable
suspicion test as objective, 184 the emphasis that the Court has
placed upon police officers’ particularized experience and
training nevertheless reveals that the test is applied with
deference to the subjective judgments of individual law
enforcement officers. 185
As one commentator has noted, the deference with
which courts approach the reasonable suspicion test is in fact
so expansive as to swallow up the requirement that a police
officer be able to point to particularized facts to justify an
Because the Supreme Court has explicitly
intrusion. 186
authorized courts to determine the reasonableness of an
investigatory procedure with reference to the experience and
180
See, e.g., United States v. Givan, 320 F.3d 452, 458-59 (3d Cir. 2003)
(finding that police had reasonable suspicion for expanding the scope of a routine
traffic stop when the driver of a car rented a day before the stop appeared “nervous and
fidgety”).
181
United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 273 (2002).
182
Id. (quoting United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 418 (1981)).
183
Cortez, 449 U.S. at 418.
184
See Sokolow, 490 U.S. at 7 (noting that the reasonable suspicion test
requires police to proffer “some minimal level of objective justification for the stop”
(emphasis added) (quoting INS v. Delgado, 466 U.S. 210, 217 (1984))).
185
See Flores, supra note 65, at 1091 (noting that the reasonable articulable
suspicion standard is flawed because of “the judiciary’s almost unwavering deference to
police determinations of whether it has been satisfied”).
186
Id.
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training of a particular officer, the Court has introduced a large
element of subjectivity into a test that it alleges to be
“objective.” 187 Even if the Court’s rulings fall short of endorsing
searches made pursuant to full-blown, individualized
subjectivity, the standard nevertheless embraces the subjective
wiles of law enforcement as an institution by constraining its
analysis to reasonable inferences drawn by an individual
“versed in the field of law enforcement.” 188 In light of law
enforcement institutions’ profoundly self-interested concern
with making arrests and obtaining convictions, Erica Flores
had noted that such a rule is tantamount to “trusting the pope
to uphold the Free Exercise Clause of the Constitution.” 189
The legal mechanics of applying a reasonable suspicion
regime to canine sniff tests are inferable from Federal case law
predating Place. While circuit court cases decided before Place
almost uniformly concluded that canine sniffs, whether
conducted in schools, at airports, or during traffic stops, did not
constitute searches for the purposes of Fourth Amendment
inquiry, the lion’s share of these decisions nevertheless
addressed the question of “cause” in dictum. 190 Even where the
circuit courts did not address the question of cause overtly,
many nevertheless recounted narratives of events that
generated police suspicion.
In United States v. Fulero, the court held that a canine
sniff was not an unreasonable search when a police dog alerted
at footlockers owned by “three hippies,” one of whom the
arresting officer recognized as “probably involved in the
Although the court dismissed the
narcotics traffic.” 191
petitioner’s assertion that the canine sniff was a search as
“frivolous,” the Court’s decision to recount the factors that gave
rise to the officer’s suspicion prior to the application of the sniff
tacitly implicated the Fourth Amendment. 192 Likewise, in
United States v. Bronstein, the Second Circuit held that a
canine sniff was not a search, but nevertheless observed that
tips received from airline personnel had provided law
enforcement officers with “ample cause” to investigate the
187
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petitioners. 193 Finally, in United States v. Klein, the Seventh
Circuit held that canine sniffs were not searches, but noted
that “authorities already had reasonable suspicion to believe
that the luggage contained contraband and used a dog as a
further investigatory device.” 194 In reaching this decision, the
Court declined to decide whether the use of canine sniffs would
be constitutional in sweeping, “dragnet-type sniffing
expedition[s].” 195 The Klein court’s final observation is in clear
tension with its ruling that canine sniffs do not implicate the
Fourth Amendment insofar as “the scope of an activity is [only]
relevant . . . as to its reasonableness once it has been
characterized as a search.” 196
One commentator has noted, more generally, that the
tendency of the Fulero, Bronstein, and Klein courts to recount
narratives of “cause” leading up to the application of canine
sniffs is in tension with their underlying conclusion that canine
sniffs, when considered alone, are not subject to Fourth
Amendment scrutiny. 197 Writing shortly after the Supreme
Court’s decision in Place, Professor Honsinger observed that “if
a sniff is not a search, it should be subject to no restrictions as
to reasonableness, and there is no valid constitutional basis for
subjecting it to a suspicion requirement.” 198 Endorsing the
Ninth Circuit’s view of the issue in United States v. Beale, 199
Honsinger went on to suggest that a canine sniff should be
considered a “subsearch” requiring a showing of at least some
level of suspicion rising above arbitrariness but falling short of
probable cause. 200
The Ninth Circuit’s treatment of the canine sniff issue
provides a compelling lens through which to view the
implications of a reasonable articulable suspicion regime. In
Beale I, a police officer observed two male Caucasians exit a
taxi cab in front of an airport. 201 After checking three pieces of
luggage, one of which bore an identification tag indicating a
New Jersey address, the two individuals parted company and
193
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463 U.S. 1202 (1983).
200
See Honsinger, supra note 127, at 1097.
201
Beale I, 674 F.2d at 1328.
194

2006]

ECONOMIC RIN-TIN-TINCENTIVES

309

obtained their airplane seating assignments from the ticket
counter. 202 The men shared the same flight itinerary, having
purchased first class tickets to San Diego with a stopover in
Houston. 203 After leaving the ticket counter separately, the two
men rejoined when they entered the boarding area. 204
Observing that their behavior was consistent with a general
drug courier profile, the officer approached the two gentlemen
The officer asked the men for
and identified himself. 205
identification and whether they had ever been arrested. 206 One
of the men, who appeared nervous, answered that he had been
arrested on a narcotics charge six years ago. 207 The officer
subsequently ordered that the bags that the two men checked
be subjected to a canine sniff test. 208 Upon sniffing the men’s
bags, the dog alerted, and the officer found narcotics. 209
The Court expressed no opinion as to whether these
facts were sufficient to generate reasonable articulable
suspicion, but nevertheless observed that the trial court had
erred in failing to conduct a Fourth Amendment inquiry. 210
Because the Ninth Circuit found that a canine sniff test was “a
Fourth Amendment intrusion, albeit a limited one,” it vacated
the trial court’s ruling and remanded the case for further
proceedings. 211 The Supreme Court subsequently vacated and
remanded the Ninth Circuit’s holding for reconsideration in
light of the Supreme Court’s classification of canine sniffs as
sui generis in United States v. Place. 212 Rehearing the case, the
Beale II 213 Court resolved somewhat defiantly that a
requirement of reasonable articulable suspicion was consistent
with the Supreme Court’s holding in Place. 214 Although this
holding was subsequently reversed following an en banc
rehearing, 215 the Beale II court nevertheless observed that the
202
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granted, 736 F.2d 1289 (9th Cir. 1983).
214
Id. at 593-94.
215
United States v. Beale (Beale III), 736 F.2d 1289 (1984).
203

310

BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 72:1

history of federal canine sniff jurisprudence in sister circuits
tacitly suggested that canine sniffs should be subjected to a
reasonable articulable suspicion standard:
Despite the general proffer of arguments tending to exclude canine
investigations from Fourth Amendment control, no federal court has
yet upheld a canine investigation in the face of a record
demonstrating a lack of prior individualized suspicion. Several
courts have expressly noted the existence of prior suspicion in
affirming the validity of the sniff, and some have stressed that the
court was not confronted with an indiscriminate “dragnet” type of
investigation. 216

In the course of reaching this conclusion, the Beale II
Court cited the aforementioned cases of Klein and Bronstein,
suggesting that a reasonable articulable suspicion regime
would validate canine sniffs conducted under conditions
resembling the facts of those cases. Moreover, although the
Beale II Court failed to cite United States v. Fulero, its
recognition that “no federal court has yet upheld a canine
investigation in the face of a record demonstrating a lack of
prior individualized suspicion” tacitly suggests the Court’s
approval of the result in Fulero. 217
Viewed through the lens of the Ninth Circuit’s holding
in Beale II, the impact of a reasonable articulable suspicion
regime on the surveillance technology market becomes clear.
Such a regime would authorize canine sniff tests under
circumstances falling far short of the requirements of probable
cause. As in Fulero, such a regime would permit canine sniffs
in instances where police suspicion is predicated on little more
than amorphous social impressions (such as one or more
suspects being a “hippy”) and uncorroborated personal
recollections (such as one or more suspects being recognized as
“involved in the drug trade”). The Ninth Circuit’s observation
thus gives rise to the conclusion that imposing a reasonable
articulable suspicion regime for canine sniffs would result in
nothing more than a perpetuation of the post-Place status quo.
The history of “reasonable suspicion” as a prerequisite for
investigatory procedures is rife with evidence of the potential
for police overreaching. Outside of the canine sniff context, the
reasonableness regime has permitted police to expand the
scope of investigations for reasons amounting to little more
216
217
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than the fact that an individual appeared “nervous and
fidgety.” 218 Because of the considerable deference accorded to
police officers in the adjudication of whether or not a search
was conducted pursuant to reasonable articulable suspicion, it
appears that such a regime would provide law enforcement
agencies with little incentive to invest in more accurate and
less intrusive alternatives to the canine sniff test.
V.

ANALYSIS OF CANINE SNIFFS UNDER A PROBABLE CAUSE
REGIME

The preceding analysis illustrates that imposing a
reasonable suspicion regime on the canine sniff test would give
police officers incentives to maintain status quo procedures.
Absent some meaningful reconfiguration of the reasonable
articulable suspicion standard, 219 self-interest will lead law
enforcement officers to proffer minimal justifications for
disproportionately invasive searches and seizures. 220 Judicial
deference to police justifications will in turn create a situation
in which law enforcement agencies do not experience the costs
of the exclusionary rule. 221 As such, it appears unlikely that a
reasonable suspicion regime would lead law enforcement
officers to divert resources to less intrusive and more effective
Imposing a probable cause regime may
technologies. 222
therefore be the best way to maximize market incentives for
the development of investigatory alternatives that more closely
resemble binary technologies. The remainder of this Note will
set forth the legal principles by which a court might subject the
canine sniff test to probable cause requirements and examine
the effects of such a regime upon the surveillance technology
market.
As noted above, the Place court based its classification
of canine sniffs as “non-searches,” in part, on the observation
that canine sniffs are non-intrusive. 223 As Justice Ginsburg
noted in her Caballes dissent, however, the imposition of a
drug sniffing canine onto an individual’s person or property can
218
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be quite intimidating. 224 As a dissenting Tenth Circuit judge
noted in United States v. Williams, “These drug dogs are not
lap dogs.” 225 Coupled with the fact that canines and their
handlers are error prone, 226 the Justices’ observations suggest
that the nature of the canine sniff intrusion merits some
heightened degree of Fourth Amendment scrutiny. Although
Justices Souter and Ginsburg ultimately conclude that
reasonable articulable suspicion would be the most appropriate
standard, 227 their analysis does not account for the fact,
elaborated upon at length above, that reasonable articulable
suspicion requirements have a minimal effect, if any at all, on
police conduct. 228 Because a reasonable articulable suspicion
regime would not accomplish the deterrent objectives of the
exclusionary rule, Justice Ginsburg’s suggestion that canine
sniffs should be controlled by Terry appears to run afoul of the
Supreme Court’s avowed objective “to compel respect for the
[Fourth Amendment] in the only effectively available way—by
removing the incentive to disregard it.” 229
A probable cause regime would accomplish this objective
most effectively. While the notion that a reasonable articulable
suspicion regime fails to deter unconstitutional police conduct
would be sufficient, in and of itself, to justify a requirement of
probable cause under the deterrence rule articulated in Mapp,
such a conclusion is equally supported by the Court’s holding in
Kyllo v. United States. Insofar as the Kyllo ruling proscribes
the warrantless application of technologies not in general
public use, 230 the Court’s holding appears to endorse the notion
that drug sniffing canines should be subjected to a probable
cause regime. Like thermal imaging devices, drug sniffing
canines are not readily available to individual consumers. 231
Since drug sniffing canines are not in general public use, their
use implicates legitimate privacy interests that should be
224
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subject to the strong protection of the Court’s exclusionary
rule. 232 Indeed, as noted above, canine sniffs may implicate
even stronger privacy interests than thermal imaging
devices. 233 Whereas thermal imaging devices enable police to
detect only a “crude visual, or . . . image” of heat radiating from
a house, 234 canine alerts permit intimate inspection of an
individual’s “persons, houses, papers, and effects.” 235
Although Kyllo’s “general public use” test arguably
provides the strongest existing judicial justification for
subjecting canine sniffs to a probable cause regime, it is
nevertheless an undesirable rationale for imposing a probable
cause requirement. As noted above, the Kyllo rule imposes a
Fourth Amendment stigma upon emerging technologies,
requiring that they be subject to probable cause requirements
until they come into general public use. If this rule is allowed a
broad application, law enforcement agencies will have no
incentive to forgo the demonstrably inaccurate and invasive
canine sniff test in favor of more reliable and less intrusive
technologies. As such, the court’s ruling in Kyllo has a chilling
effect on the development of technologies such as the nascent
“Dog-on-a-Chip”—a handheld sensing device designed to mimic
(and even improve upon) the capabilities of a drug sniffing
canine. 236 Under the Kyllo rule, this technology would be
subject to Fourth Amendment scrutiny even though its
compactness and accuracy assures that it is less invasive than
the canine sniff test. 237 Moreover, since the device promises to
greatly reduce law enforcement agencies’ expenditures in the
course of providing food and general care for their canine
detection units, applying the Kyllo rule would detract from the
significant savings that this device promises for law
enforcement agencies. 238 Therefore, the Kyllo rule would result
in a net loss in the realm of public safety by requiring that
resources that would otherwise be freed for other law
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enforcement activities continue to be expended in the service of
an antiquated canine program.
It follows from this analysis that a probable cause
regime is most likely to encourage law enforcement agencies to
divert resources from canine detection programs to
technologies that are more accurate and less invasive. In order
for such a regime to be effective, a court subjecting the canine
sniff test to a probable cause requirement would need to
carefully distinguish Kyllo on the ground that Kyllo involved a
bright line protection of the home—an environment in which
the court concluded that all details are “intimate.” 239 Such a
ruling would have the twin virtues of remedying the negative
consequences of the Caballes Court’s holding that canine sniffs
are not searches for the purposes of the Fourth Amendment
and freeing police officers to pursue new search technologies for
purposes other than home surveillance.
VI.

CONCLUSION

This Note has shown that the Caballes Court’s
classification of the canine sniff as a non-search provides
incentives for law enforcement agencies to maintain their use
of canines as an investigatory device. This consequence is
undesirable from a policy perspective in light of pervasive
evidence indicating that canines, contrary to the prevailing
legal wisdom, are not one hundred percent accurate. Because
canines err, false alerts enable police officers to conduct fullblown searches of people and objects that implicate legitimate
privacy interests. This empirical fact lends support to the
argument that canine sniffs should be subject to some level of
Fourth Amendment scrutiny. Reasonable articulable suspicion
will not suffice, however, to accomplish the deterrent objective
of the exclusionary rule. Because courts determine whether or
not a search was supported by reasonable articulable suspicion
with undue deference to the subjective impressions of police
officers, incentive remains for law enforcement agencies to
maintain their investments in the inaccurate and invasive drug
sniffing canine.
By requiring that police officers conduct investigations
and uncover facts sufficient to merit the issuance of a judicial
warrant, a requirement of probable cause will provide the
239
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greatest incentive for law enforcement agencies to seek more
accurate and less invasive technologies. Law enforcement
demand will, in turn, foster development of such technologies
in the market, provided that courts considering such
technologies are careful to distinguish the use of these
technologies in the field from the facts at issue in Kyllo v.
United States. Because Kyllo’s holding can be limited to the
use of emerging technologies for the purpose of home
surveillance, requiring police officers to have probable cause
prior to the use of a drug sniffing canine will enable law
enforcement agencies to better provide for public safety without
running afoul of the Fourth Amendment’s proscription of
unreasonable searches and seizures.
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